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This article is the first to cover the transformation in criminal law
teaching away from the case method and towards a more open-ended
philosophical approach in the 1930s. It makes three contributions. One,
it shows how Columbia law professor Herbert Wechsler revolutionized
the teaching of criminal law by de-emphasizing cases and including a
variety of non-case-related material in his 1940 text Criminal Law and
Its Administration. Two, it reveals that at least part of Wechsler's
intention behind transforming criminal law teaching was to undermine
Langdell's case method, which he blamed for producing a "closed-
system" view of the law that contributed to the Supreme Court's
destruction of the first half of the New Deal. Three, it shows that
Wechsler's text inspired an entire generation of law teachers who
believed that criminal law should be taught as a "liberal arts" course,
precisely so that law students would not become criminal lawyers. The
legal academy's disdain for criminal practice, this article concludes,
allowed scholars like Wechsler to introduce innovations in criminal law
teaching that became a subsequent model for law teaching generally in
the United States during the latter half of the twentieth century.
Few areas of legal practice command more popular attention than criminal
law.' Yet, the manner in which criminal law is taught in law schools has relatively
little to do with preparing students for criminal practice. Beginning in the 1930s,
law schools intentionally reconfigured their criminal law courses so that students
would not become criminal lawyers. The "honors" of criminal law practice, it was
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agreeing to be interviewed for this article, as well as Joshua Dressler, Markus Dubber, and Paul
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I One need only reference a small sampling of the number of television shows dedicated to
criminal law. See, e.g., Boston Legal (ABC television broadcast); JAG (CBS television broadcast);
Law & Order (NBC television broadcast); Law & Order Special Victims Unit (NBC television
broadcast); and Shark (CBS television broadcast), to name a few.
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believed, were "frequently somewhat on the dubious side," not fitting for law
students interested in a respectable career and a superior "social position."'
The first law school to move away from training criminal lawyers was
Columbia.3  Spurred by a sharp "decline of employment" at private law firms
during the Great Depression, Columbia administrators modified their criminal law
offering, hoping to use the class as a means of preparing students not for criminal
practice, but for "the phenomenal increase in governmental functions," and rapidly
increasing "demand for competent lawyers" in Frandin Delano Roosevelt's New
Deal .
Though the New Deal ended in 1939, the casebook that came out of
Columbia's criminal law course went on to revolutionize criminal law teaching in
the United States. Co-authored by Columbia law professors Herbert Wechsler and
Jerome Michael, Criminal Law and Its Administration became the first law school
casebook to successfully synthesize social science materials with cases, inspiring a
generation of criminal law teachers to organize their courses along similar lines.
5
Sanford H. Kadish, to take just one influential example, modeled his 1962
Criminal Law and Its Processes after Wechsler, spawning a wave of similar texts
in the 1960s and 1970s.6  As late as May 2008, Kadish-remaining true to
2 George Wilfred Stumberg, Book Review, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 1123, 1123 (1941) (reviewing
JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1940)); ARTHUR
LEWIS WOOD, CRIMINAL LAWYER 39-40 (1967).
3 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 325
(1955).
4 Id. A similar phenomenon happened at Yale. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
YALE, 1927-1960, at 182 (1986).
5 According to Laura Kalman, Michael and Wechsler's Criminal Law and Its Administration
was the first casebook that successfully "integrated law with the social sciences." KALMAN, supra
note 4, at 90, 97. Earlier attempts had been made by Albert Jacobs, Karl Llewellyn, William 0.
Douglas, and Felix Frankfurter, but, according to Kalman, they did not stray far from the Langdellian
model. See id. at 78-79, 85-90. Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler completed the first
unpublished version of their casebook for the private use of Columbia University law students in
1935. Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, Cases and Materials in Criminal Law and Its
Administration (1935) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Arthur W. Diamond Law Library,
Columbia University). The formal casebook was published in 1940. HERBERT WECHSLER & JEROME
MICHAEL, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION: CASES, STATUTES, AND COMMENTARIES (1940)
[hereinafter MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW].
6 Interview with Sanford H. Kadish, Alexander F. and May T. Morrison Professor of Law,
Emeritus, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, in Berkeley, Cal. (May 19, 2008) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter Kadish, Interview]. Monrad Paulsen and Sanford Kadish credited Wechsler directly in
their 1962 casebook. MONRAD G. PAULSEN & SANFORD H. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS xiii (1st ed. 1962). Kadish, Schulhofer, and Steiker still cite to
Wechsler in what is now the eighth edition of the casebook. SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th
ed. 2007). Joshua Dressler credits Wechsler through Kadish. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW xi (3d ed. 2003). Other casebooks that follow the Michael and
Wechsler approach include RICHARD J. BONNIE, ANNE M. COUGHLIN, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & PETER
W. Low, CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 2004); GEORGE E. DiX & M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW:
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Wechsler's vision-asserted that his book, even in its eighth edition, was not
designed for "training legal practitioners. 7
Taking the Depression-Era beginnings of criminal law at Columbia as a
starting point, this article takes a closer look at the history of the criminal law
course, using previously unexamined primary sources to illustrate that the class is
animated by a doubly subversive aim. Not only did Michael and Wechsler reorient
criminal law away from the practitioner, but they organized it in such a manner as
to undermine the case method itself. Convinced that the so-called "Langdellian
method" had contributed to the Supreme Court's destruction of early New Deal
programs by fostering a view of the law as a "closed-system," Michael and
Wechsler hoped to disrupt Christopher Columbus Langdell's legacy and open
students' eyes to law's interrelationship with society, revolutionizing law teaching
in the process.8 Whereas Langdell's disciples simply had students read cases, for
example, Michael and Wechsler substituted cases for outside materials and
editorial comments, including normative questions like whether certain offenses
were "objectionable," whether it was ever "justifiable" to kill nonviolent offenders,
and whether European codes were more "wise" than American ones.9
That Michael and Wechsler sought to revolutionize law teaching by making
criminal law a vehicle for challenging the case method is not a subject that legal
historians have explored.10 Yet, its implications are potentially profound. Every
year, thousands of law students graduate thinking that they have studied criminal
law using the case method, when they have not. Every year, the same law students
graduate thinking that they have been trained for criminal practice, when they have
not. At a time when law schools are confronting mounting pressure to increase the
CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2002); MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, COMMENTS (2005); JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA
BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND' MATERIALS (5th ed. 2004); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS (3rd ed. 2001); CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATIRIALS (2005); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES
AND CONTROVERSIES (2d ed. 2008); and LLOYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT,
QUESTIONS (7th ed. 2003). Even Rollin Perkins has conceded "the modem dominance of statutes,"
and included extensive notes with editorial comments and citations to law reviews. RONALD N.
BOYCE, DONALD A. DRIPPS & ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND
MATERIALS (9th ed. 2004).
7 Kadish, Interview, supra note 6, at 14.
8 Interview by Norman Silber and Geoffrey Miller with Herbert Wechsler, Professor,
Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, in New York City, N.Y. (Aug. 11, 1978; Feb. 23, 1979; Mar. 12 & 13,
1982) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wechsler, Interview].
9 MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 145, 201, 224. For descriptions of
Langdell's method, see KALMAN, supra note 4, at 10-20; Howard Schweber, Before Langdell: The
Roots of American Legal Science, in 2 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES 606,629-34 (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999).
i0 In one of the most careful studies of legal education in the United States to date, Laura
Kalman concludes that Langdell's "method" remained dominant despite the rise of legal realism. See
KALMAN, supra note 4, at 229.
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practical nature of their first year curricula, the history of criminal law might
provide a clue into how certain courses became more theoretical, and whether this
trend is worth reversing.'"
Further, recovering the hidden history of criminal law might enable us to
better assess the status of the case method generally in American legal education.
For example, even a cursory comparison of the average twenty-first century
criminal law casebook with Joseph Henry Beale's 1894 text suggests that
Langdell's method, at least in the criminal law context, is dead.12 Though modem
casebooks appear to focus on cases, few use more than two cases to illustrate a
legal point, few require that students be able to distinguish between more than
three cases, and none create the impression that learning legal rules from briefing
cases is sufficient for mastering criminal law.' 3 Instead, criminal law casebooks
push students to consider the philosophical, social, and moral implications of
criminalization, punishment, and crime itself, transforming the class into what
Sanford Kadish has called "almost liberal arts.
14
To further illustrate the pedagogical and political ramifications of Michael
and Wechsler's innovation in the criminal law course, this article will proceed in
four parts. Part I will return to the Langdellian case method, showing how Harvard
Professor and Langdell prot6g6 Joseph Henry Beale utilized the method in his
popular 1894 criminal law casebook. Part II will show how Herbert Wechsler and
Jerome Michael reacted to "Bealism" by reinventing the criminal law course in the
1930s."5 Part III will discuss initial responses to Michael and Wechsler's
approach, showing how scholars suspicious of criminal practitioners embraced it.
Part IV will trace the dramatic rise of the Wechslerian method in American law
schools from the 1940s through the 1990s, showing how Michael and Wechsler's
tendency to de-emphasize cases led to a new kind of casebook that transformed
criminal law.
11 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007). Reassessments
of first year curricula did not begin with the Carnegie Report. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Harvard
Law Decides to Steep Students in 21st Century Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006, at A10. The report
has appeared to fuel the debate, however, over whether the first year should be modified. See, e.g.,
Dean Claudio Grossman, Address at the Innovations in the First Year Curriculum Conference,
American University's Washington College of Law (Mar. 21, 2008); Katharine Mangan, A Plea for
Real- World Training in Law Schools, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 19, 2007, at A6.
12 JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR., A SELECTION OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES UPON
CRIMINAL LAW (1894) [hereinafter BEALE, CASES].
13 See supra text accompanying note 6.
14 Kadish, Interview, supra note 6, at 14.
15 Jerome Frank coined the term "Bealism." See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 55 (1930).
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I. JOSEPH HENRY BEALE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW CASE METHOD
In 1894, a young law professor named Joseph Henry Beale, Jr. assembled a
textbook that covered the core subjects of criminal law by referring almost entirely
to cases. 16 A "second generation disciple of Langdell," Beale made it clear that the
cases he had selected were "chiefly intended for the use of classes in the schools,"
and that in order for students to "get the benefit" of studying them, it was
necessary to "omit" either commentary or head notes. 17 Instead, Beale made his
students sift through relatively large numbers of cases from different jurisdictions
to distill, as best they could, basic criminal law principles.' 8  He divided his
casebook into twenty-two chapters, the first eleven covering what might be
considered the general part of the criminal law: "the criminal act," the "criminal
intent," "justification," as well as procedural considerations like "the indictment,"
"former conviction or acquittal," and "criminal procedure." 9  The last eleven
chapters, conversely, included specific offenses like larceny, embezzlement, false
pretences, conspiracy, and nuisance.20
For each topic, no matter whether general or specific, Beale included
anywhere from six to nine cases. To take just one example, he covered the specific
offense of voluntary manslaughter by assigning eight cases and nothing else. The
first case, drawn from England, held that words alone could not constitute
provocation but, if words led to combat "betwixt two upon a sudden heat," then
any ensuing death could be charged as manslaughter.2' In the next case, a
defendant was impressed into the "Majesty's service" without a valid warrant,
leading several men to come to his rescue, killing a police officer in the process.
22
Reluctant to offer "encouragement to private men to take upon themselves to be
the assertors of other men's liberties," the court held that the killing was murder,
not manslaughter.23 In the remaining six cases, all drawn from English courts,
students were required to actively consider different applications of the principle of
provocation, all arising from slightly different factual scenarios, including
16 BEALE, CASES, supra note 12. For Beale's dominance in the early years of the twentieth
century, see E. W. Puttkammer, Book Review, 8. U. Cni. L. REv. 386 (1941) (reviewing JEROME
MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMNISTRATION (1940)).
17 STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 93 (2000). BEALE, CASES, supra note 12, at Preface
(no page delineated).
18 Beale praised Langdell's pedagogical approach in an article written for the New York
University Law Quarterly Review in 1931. See Joseph H. Beale, Langdell, Gray, Thayer and Ames:
Their Contribution to the Study and Teaching of Law 8 N.Y.U. L. Q. Rev. 385, 385-88 (1931)
[hereinafter Beale, Langdell].
19 BEALE, CASES, supra note 12, at vii-viii.
20 Id. at viii-ix.
21 Id. at 474.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 476.
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throwing a pickpocket into an "adjoining pond," stabbing a woman in the back
after she delivered a "box on the ear," and killing a constable in response to an
"illegal" arrest.
24
In none of the scenarios did Beale provide any commentary or outside
sources. Nor did he mention any statute. Instead, he presented the students with
cases that collectively illustrated classic common law examples of provocation,
meanwhile providing some sense of the limits of those rules. From a pedagogical
perspective, the section provided students with an active opportunity to learn legal
rules by deriving them from factual scenarios, without getting into a critical
discussion of why those rules existed.
Even when Beale did include non-case materials, they invariably constituted
ruminations on what the common law was, not what it should be. Perhaps
foremost among his outside sources was William Hawkins's A Treatise of the
Pleas of the Crown.2 5 Hawkins's Treatise did not encourage students to think
critically about whether the common law should be changed, but sought simply to
illustrate what it said. For example, Beale introduced the crime of murder by
including an excerpt from Hawkins explaining the evolution of the offense from
one that initially punished towns for failing to produce the killer of a "Dane[ ]" to a
general crime applicable to anyone who killed an "Englishman" with "malice
prepense. ' 26 Immediately following the excerpt, Beale included six cases.27
In the first case, the court held that if a constable "and others in his
assistance" were killed during an attempt to suppress "an affray" then the killer
was guilty of murder, whether he intended to kill the party or not.28 In the next
case, the court held that even if a private citizen attempted to break up a domestic
dispute, the accidental killing of that citizen by one of the disputing parties could
be considered murder, provided that the killer had "notice" of the victim's intent.29
For the next three cases, Beale presented similar situations where malice could be
implied. They included an instance where an employer used "a bar of iron" to
discipline a servant; a father set fire to a house with his retarded son inside; and a
killer shot at a man on horseback but mistakenly hit a bystander.30 By the final
case in the series, students were well versed in the principle that malice could be
inferred in cases where the defendant committed an "intentional" deadly act
24 Id. at 477-87.
25 Id. at 461 (citing WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1824)).
26 BEALE, CASES, supra note 12, at 461. According to Hawkins, the original crime of murder
in England was enacted by King Canute simply to save the lives of Danes, not Englishmen. If a Dane
was killed, the "the town or hundred where the fact was done was to be amerced to the king[.j" Id.
27 Id. at 461-71.
28 Id. at 462.
29 Id. at 462-63.
30 Id. at 463, 465, 468.
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without facing "impending peril to life or member" or some kind of legitimate
"provocation." 3'
To further elaborate on the differences between murder and manslaughter,
Beale included no fewer than nine more cases. Again, each case provided students
with a relatively clear example of a legal rule. First-degree murder required
premeditated and deliberate design. 32 Second-degree murder included provocation
by words alone.33 Manslaughter applied when death was the result of either
legitimate provocation or accidental killing.
34
What might students have learned from such an approach? Clearly, they
learned how to read and organize relatively large groupings of cases, six to nine
being common to cover one particular topic-a number that provided students with
a framework within which to assess a wide range of factual scenarios. By
excluding extraneous notes and outside sources, Beale pushed students to learn the
law much as they would if they were alone in a library at a law firm, going through
hundreds of cases to determine the contours of a legal rule.
As Beale himself remembered it, the case method marked a dramatic shift
away from passive learning-the process of simply "hearing or reading the
knowledge of a teacher"-and towards a more active approach in which the
student "gains [knowledge] for himself, first hand, from the sources. 35 Though
such an approach may not be as "formally correct as that received from a master,"
noted Beale, it made a deeper impression on students, and remained longer in their
memories, even to the point of becoming "part of [their] mental fiber." 36 The
value of the case method, in other words, was that it was a type of practical, active
learning, a learning best facilitated through the assignment of relatively large
numbers of cases for students to work through alone.37
In addition to its pedagogic value, Beale's approach had a certain political
aspect as well. By presenting students with nothing but cases, many dating back to
sixteenth and seventeenth century England, Beale created an image of the common
law as an authoritative source of legal rules, something to be revered rather than
reformed. Even cases that begged for statutory reform, like the imputation of
malice for accidental killings, marshaled a certain respect in Beale's universe
simply because they derived from the common law.
Beale's celebration of the common law made him Langdellian. Like
Christopher Columbus Langdell, who introduced the case method to Harvard in
1870, Beale instilled in his students an impression of the law as something derived
3' Id. at 470.
32 Id. at 472.
33 Id. at 474.
34 Id. at 474-87.
35 Beale, Langdell, supra note 18, at 386.
36 Id.
37 See ROBERT STEvENs, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO
THE 1980s, at 54-55 (1983).
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not from immutable, natural law principles, but actual, real-world cases. 38 In
Langdell's mind, students should be given the impression that law was a "logically
coherent system of technical rules" that were to be learned from a positive rather
than a normative standpoint.39 Indeed, Langdell believed strongly that the "chief
business of a lawyer" was to "learn and administer the law as it is," not as it "ought
to be.' 4° Even judges should not be engaged in raw policy-making but bound by
the common law rule of precedent, discouraged from exercising any kind of
radical, reformist impulse.
Langdell's approach coincided nicely with a variety of prevailing educational,
political and economic trends in the United States during the latter years of the
nineteenth century. Thanks to the Civil War, which brought an "abrupt and violent
conclusion" to professional faith in natural law, Langdell's emphasis on judicial
positivism provided a welcome respite.4' Pedagogically, it provided a
sophisticated counterpoint to the recitation of legal rules, the primary methodology
in the earliest, most primitive law schools.42 It also provided an alternative to the
law office apprenticeship, perhaps the most popular means of becoming a lawyer
in the nineteenth century.43
Even more importantly, Langdell's anti-contextual approach coincided nicely
with the rise of the Industrial Revolution. As industry boomed in the final years of
the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court assumed a "[] skeptical posture toward
state regulation of property and business." 44  Reluctant to impede economic
growth, the Supreme Court adopted a formalist adherence to presumably
fundamental doctrines of liberty of contract and due process, doctrines that it deftly
used to strike down regulatory legislation.a Whether Langdell anticipated the rise
of this formalism or not, his decision to assign cases, and cases only,
complemented the Court's jurisprudence by instilling in students a respect for
private law-ordering along with a concomitant contempt for legislative
intervention in the business arena.
The Court's contempt for public law, the apotheosis of which emerged in
Lochner v. New York in 1905, sparked dissent in the legal academy.46 In 1915, for
example, future Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter argued that the "growing
legislative activity of the time" should guide law schools in revising their curricula,
38 FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 93; KALMAN, supra note 4, at 10-12.
39 WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LoGic AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL
EDUCATION 78 (1994).
40 Id. at 77.
41 FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 86.
42 LAPIANA, supra note 39, at 48.
43 Id. at 47.
44 JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTIUriONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 88 (3d ed. 2008).
41 Id. at 90-92.
46 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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moving them away from strict adherence to the case method and toward a more
normative, policy-oriented approach.47 Animating Frankfurter's pleas were at least
two factors: the need for public regulation of rapidly expanding, injury-producing,
and sometimes irresponsible private industries; and the inability of the courts and
the private bar to respond proactively to large-scale regulatory problems. Noting
that courts were "already laboring under too heavy a pressure," and that private
lawyers were "overworked" and too "absorbed" in resolving cases to think
"consciously" and "systematically" about meeting the demands of a rapidly
industrializing mass society, Frankfurter identified "teachers of the law" as the
"natural" candidates for arriving at solutions to some of the Progressive Era's most
tenacious legal problems. 8
Frankfurter also called for the production of a new type of law student. "It is
not enough that young men should come from our schools equipped to become
skillful practitioners," he argued, "[w]e must show them the law as an instrument,"
something that can be used "for human betterment" and not simply a tool in the
hands of "clever pleaders., 49 Though Frankfurter did not go so far as to assert that
the case method should be abandoned, he alluded to it negatively, noting that
students should no longer be taught that law was simply a "Procrustean bed" of
precedent "into which all persons and all societies must inexorably be fitted.,
50
Such words decried both the strict adherence to common law cases that Langdell
and Beale advocated, as well as the type of deductive logic that they sought to
instill in their students-logic that, in Frankfurter's words, simply applied "old
loyalties to new facts.' Instead, Frankfurter called for "adapting old principles to
present needs," and an inductive approach to solving legal problems by
"assimilating social and economic facts" to cast light on "new conditions. 52
These were progressive words, both in the sense that they sought to link legal
education to the larger goals of socially-conscious Progressive-Era reformers, and
also in the manner that they questioned strict adherence to the Langdellian case
method as sufficient preparation for legal practice.
Others agreed. In 1924 Columbia Law School Dean Harlan Fiske Stone
declared that while the case method was helpful in negotiating "the jungle of
judicial decisions," law professors should not approach legal teaching as simply "a
hermetically sealed compartment., 53 Instead, they should look to the "social and
economic forces" which gave law its "form and substance., 54 No historical event
47 Felix Frankfurter, The Law and the Law Schools, 1 A.B.A. J. 532, 535, 539 (1915).
48 Id. at 537-38.
49 Id. at 539.
50 id.
5' Id. at 540.
52 Id. at 537.
53 Harlan Fiske Stone, Some Phases of Legal Education in America, 58 AM. L. REV. 747,
752-54 (1924).
'4 Id. at 754.
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brought this lesson home more poignantly than the Great Depression. Sparked by
a stock market crash in 1929, the Depression led to massive disruptions in
employment, productivity, and consumer confidence, pushing national leaders like
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to develop public law solutions to what seemed a
massive, nation-threatening, private-sector debacle.
Interestingly, the nation's plunge into economic depression following the
Crash of 1929 had an unexpected impact on law school curricula, particularly as
the New Deal spurred a "fascination with the burgeoning federal government.,
55
As Columbia University law professor Julius Goebel remembered it, the "decline
of employment by law offices due to the rigors of the Great Depression," coupled
with the "phenomenal increase in governmental functions" during the New Deal,
made it "urgent" that the school begin to train students in "public law. ' 56 This
need led Columbia to hire a promising young graduate and former Goebel research
fellow named Herbert Wechsler, a proponent of the New Deal who would come to
have a remarkable impact on the teaching of criminal law.
II. WECHSLER & MICHAEL RESPOND TO BEALE
Herbert Wechsler, who graduated from Columbia in 1931 in the midst of a
Depression-ravaged job market, brought with him his own reasons for upsetting
the case method. Like many young scholars at the time, Wechsler believed that the
Great Depression had been caused by problems inherent to laissez-faire
economics, not least of them unregulated banking, an un-policed stock exchange,
and an over-confidence in market forces that collectively made a mockery of the
formalist premise that economic affairs were best managed through the private
adjudication of legal disputes. The case method, which focused on judicial
adjudication and therefore perpetuated what Roscoe Pound called the common
law's "antipathy to legislation," denigrated state regulation as a lesser form of
lawmaking-if not an outright intrusion into fundamental rights of property and
contract.57 As law's old guard clung to Langdell in the midst of the howling
1930s, Wechsler began to view the case method as limiting and even dangerous.
Not surprisingly, he turned to earlier thinkers who had long called for curricular
reform, including law teachers like Felix Frankfurter.
58
55 STEvENs, supra note 37, at 160.
56 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 325.
57 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454,462 (1909).
58 See, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 47. Interestingly, Wechsler's relationship with
Frankfurter lent more than just intellectual support to his decision to break from the case method and
produce a different type of lawyer. Thanks to connections that he had with the Roosevelt
administration, Frankfurter became a "one-man employment agency" for recent law graduates
interested in working for federal New Deal agencies. DAvID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR:
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945, at 121 (1999). Though he would later
become more conservative, Roscoe Pound also called for curricular reform. Pound, supra note 57, at
470.
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To Herbert Wechsler and his senior colleague Jerome Michael, Frankfurter
provided theoretical ammunition for fighting the nation's frightening plunge into
economic recession, a recession accelerated by doctrinal formalism. Frankfurter's
conviction that students should be taught that law is "an instrument" to be used for
"human betterment" impressed them, as did Frankfurter's support for President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal.59 Both Michael and Wechsler proudly
endorsed Roosevelt, standing out as two of only five "New Dealers" on
Columbia's law faculty at the time.60 When the Supreme Court began striking
down New Deal programs like the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the
National Industrial Recovery Act on what they believed were overtly formalist,
"closed system" grounds, both Michael and Wechsler placed at least some blame
at the feet of the case method for producing an isolated, politically unresponsive
judiciary. 6' As Wechsler later remembered it, the Court possessed no "receptivity
to statutory changes of the common law," lacked any "sympathetic treatment of
administrative agencies," and clung desperately to the notion of the common law
as a "closed system," a position that deserved "unqualified disdain. 62
Rather than view law as a closed system, Wechsler came to view it in more
"utilitarian" terms, an instrument of "statecraft" that could be used to pull the
country out of its fiscal woes.63 Before this could happen, however, lawyers and
law students needed to learn to think about the law differently; as a tool for change
and not a prophylactic to state intervention and control. Wechsler distilled these
notions into four separate "articles of faith" that guided his legal career. 64 They
included: (1) a rejection of the common law as a "closed system," (2) an emphasis
on "judicial receptivity to statutory changes of the common law," (3) a
presumption that "legal understanding is imperfectly attained" and, (4) an
"unqualified disdain" for the Supreme Court's formalist destruction of New Deal
programs "despite the magnitude of the abuse and dislocation incident to the
development of an industrial society."
65
Wechsler let his "articles of faith" guide his selection of materials for teaching
criminal law. Not offered at Columbia prior to Wechsler's arrival on the faculty in
1931, criminal law had been virtually ignored due to the fact that it was "generally
thought to have no money in it" and was therefore "not interesting" to most
"bread-and-butter" students.66 Precisely for this reason, Wechsler saw teaching the
59 Frankfurter, supra note 47, at 539.
60 Wechsler, Interview, supra note 8, at 50.
61 Id. at 32.
62 Id. at 50-51.
63 Id. at 48.
64 Id. at 50-5 1.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 106.
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course as an "opportunity" for him to put his philosophical and political
assumptions into practice.67
Frustrated with what he perceived to be a disconnect between law's political
underpinnings and the apolitical nature of the case method, Wechsler joined his
colleague Jerome Michael in putting together a different kind of criminal law
casebook in 1934. In thinking about what to include, Wechsler later remembered
that he sought to assemble "pedagogical materials" that "invited cogitation outside
the closed system., 68 The "closed system" in his opinion, was what Langdell
advanced, namely a notion that the "whole process of learning, understanding,
[and] applying the law was a process of uncovering the leading cases" and through
a process of "logical deduction" applying them to "new situations." 69  To
Wechsler, such a "closed" method had contributed to the Supreme Court's early,
anti-New Deal stance. Instead of focusing on the "closed system" of the common
law then, which provided "no room for legislative or quasi-legislative judgment,"
Wechsler turned instead to a much more open system of legal pedagogy, one that
incorporated a variety of materials and posed a variety of questions. 70 Intent on
getting students to think about legislation as an important mode of legal action,
Wechsler assembled his casebook so as not to simply require that students "distill
the law" from reading cases, but rather ponder "interesting questions" like: "what
are the consequences of this or the other type of formulation or norm?" "How can
we find out something about consequences?" And, "how can we face up candidly
to value choices?"'71 Such questions, believed Wechsler, constituted a "wholly
different way of thinking about [the] law" than the earlier "Langdellian way." 72
To experience a taste of Wechsler's approach, it is helpful to compare his
casebook's section on voluntary manslaughter with that of Joseph Henry Beale.
Unlike Beale, who assigned a total of eight full cases for students to read on the
subject, Wechsler assigned one. The case, Regina v. Welsh, was one that Beale
had included in his casebook and originated from England in 1869. It involved a
defendant who had taken his future victim to court for reclamation of a debt only
to find the claim repudiated by a judge.73 Angry over his defeat, the defendant
went to a "public-house," or bar, where he met his future victim, who ridiculed
him for failing to secure the debt.74 Enraged, the defendant approached the victim
(who put up his hand in defense), and then stabbed him with a "clasp knife,"
killing him on the spot.75 Desperate to have his charge of murder reduced to
67 Id. at 105-06.
68 Id. at 105.
69 Id. at 32.
70 Id. at 100-01.
71 Id. at 100.
72 Id. at 101.
73 MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 148.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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manslaughter, the defendant tried to claim that he acted "under the influence of
passion," only to have the court rule that provocation must be such as would excite
"the mind of a reasonable man" and that "mere words" did not suffice, nor did
"putting" out one's hand in defense, as the victim seemed to do when the
defendant approached him.76
For Beale, that was all that students needed to know.77 Compared to the case
where the defendant had actually been in combat, Welsh did not constitute grounds
for provocation, nor could it be synthesized with the case where the defendant was
pick-pocketed and threw his thief into an "adjoining pond," gaining the
provocation defense.78 If anything, Welsh bore distinct similarities to the
defendant who had stabbed a woman in the back for boxing him on the ear.79
Such doctrinal distinctions formed only a small part of Wechsler's analysis.
Throughout the case, he included footnotes that referred to law review articles and
commission reports, even describing the evolution of the doctrine in the United
States over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. °
Immediately following the case, Wechsler included a series of "Notes" that
included brief summaries of several cases along with North Dakota's statutory
prohibition against infanticide, an excerpt from Bentham's "Theory of
Legislation," an excerpt from Holmes's "The Common Law," and a statute from
India.81
What might students have learned from such materials? The brief notes on
cases were probably designed to perform a function similar to Beale's full cases.
Each one presented a slightly different factual take on the provocation rule,
including a defendant whose girlfriend had confessed to having had an affair, a
defendant who hit a neighbor's wife with an axe after a dispute over a property
line, and a defendant who shot a police officer in order to resist an unlawful
arrest.82 The other materials, however, particularly the excerpts from Bentham and
Holmes, aimed at a different target. Bentham's selection, for example, argued that
punishments should not be reduced for cases where passions were high, but rather
should be increased to "exceed the advantage of the offence." 83 Precisely because
people were more prone to commit offenses while under the "heat of passion," the
punishment should be "[even] more an object of dread" than in cases where the
defendant was operating rationally.84 Clearly, such a proposition invited debate
76 Id. at 149-5 1.
77 BEALE, CASES, supra note 12, at 473.
78 Id. at 477.
79 Id.
80 MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 149-50.
81 Id. at 151-59.
82 Id. at 151-54.
83 Id. at 158.
g4 Id. at 158-59.
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over the value of the provocation defense, including why it should be allowed at
all. This was something that Beale's text did not do. Nor did Beale cite Holmes,
who noted that if the "object of punishment is prevention," then punishments
should be more severe in cases of "great excitement." 85 At least twice, Wechsler
included materials that tested the wisdom behind the common law rule, in addition
to requiring students to learn the rule. Following his case notes, for example,
Wechsler provided discussion questions such as: "Do you agree with Bentham?"
and "What justification is there for making criminal homicides which are
provoked?
86
If nothing else, here was a relatively dramatic shift away from the pedagogical
theory originally envisioned by either Beale or Langdell. Though Michael and
Wechsler incorporated cases into their text, at least half of their materials were
designed not to drive home the basic principles of the common law, so much as to
engender debate about what that law, ultimately, should be. From one perspective,
such an approach might be viewed as a type of refutation of the common law, an
approach to teaching that presumed the law could be changed and should be
changed based not on deducing eternal principles from past cases, but rather
thinking critically about the law's function in everyday life. This type of legal
education aimed to create a very different type of lawyer, if you will, than
Langdell's method. Instead of an attorney who revered the presumably timeless
principles of the common law, or even one who simply limited his professional
goals to the representation of clients, Michael and Wechsler's method favored, if
not presumed, that students would become active players in the legislative process.
In certain ways, Wechsler was preparing students to become enlightened leaders
whose knowledge of the law would carry directly into public service.
III. EARLY REACTIONS TO THE CASEBOOK
Michael and Wechsler's casebook did not go unnoticed. In 1941, University
of Texas law professor George Wilfred Stumberg reviewed the work, commending
the two Columbia law professors for doing more than simply updating Beale. In
Stumberg' s opinion, Michael and Wechsler had raised "a timely question" as to the
"purposes that can and should be served by American law schools in giving a
course in criminal law." 87  Noting that "relatively few law-school graduates
practice criminal law," Stumberg downplayed the need for instilling "technical
knowledge" about the criminal process. 88 In fact, he even went so far as to argue
that the "ambitious law graduate" should not be "blamed for shunning the criminal
85 Id. at 158.
86 Id. at 161-62.
87 Stumberg, supra note 2, at 1123. See also David Riesman, Jr., Law and Social Science: A
Report on Michael and Wechsler's Classbook on Criminal Law and Administration, 50 YALE L.J.
636 (1941).
88 Stumberg, supra note 2, at 1123.
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courts" a "not very nice" place where success hinged more on being "sharp-witted"
than "learned." 89
Convinced that law schools would be better off dropping Criminal Law than
offering a course on the nuts and bolts of practice, Stumberg maintained that the
course should be used to fulfill "greater obligations." 90 Such obligations, in his
opinion, included training students to think about the "long range social
considerations" of criminal law policy, not to mention the contributions of
"criminologists" and "psychiatrists" to understanding why crime occurred and how
law might be used to control it.9' Unimpressed by criminal practitioners, who
Stumberg believed were "preoccupied with their day by day tasks" and limited in
their understanding of "positive law," the Texas professor approved Michael and
Wechsler's attempt to go beneath the "surface" and make students think critically
about the "law in action."
92
It was a remarkable review, not only for its overwhelming support of the
Wechsler-and-Michael text, but for the insight that it cast on the pedagogical and
professional context of teaching criminal law at the time. For example, Stumberg
made it relatively clear that the practice of criminal law was not something that
most law students in Texas aspired to do, nor was it something that they should
aspire to do. Indeed, he seemed to desire that criminal law teachers not even try to
encourage their students to go into criminal law, something that was a poor choice
for "bright young" men "with an eye to profit and social position." 93 Whether
Stumberg worried that criminal lawyers would not match the alumni contributions
of students who entered "offices whose clients do not carry even the slightest scent
of the jail" is uncertain, yet he clearly did not see criminal practice to be a worthy
occupation for University of Texas graduates.94
Interestingly, just as Stumberg seemed adamant about discouraging students
from criminal practice, so too did he express enthusiasm for using criminal law as
a vehicle for getting them to think like policy makers.95 Evidence of this emerged
in Stumberg's closing paragraph where he praised Michael and Wechsler for
transforming criminal law into a method for encouraging students to engage in
"social thinking" not personal interest.96 "If this emphasis [on social thinking] is
unsound," he noted, for example, then "the shouting of these last years about
'social engineering' has been unsound. 97 What Stumberg meant by "shouting"
89 Id.
90 Id.
92 Id. at 1123-24.
92 Id. at 1124.
" Id. at 1123.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1125.
97 Id.
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about social engineering was not clear. Interest in "the application of expertise to
society" had begun as early as 1911, and continued through the 1920s.9' What did
the recent "shouting" refer to? One possibility is that Stumberg was responding to
a surge of scholarly interest in the late 1930s focusing on the manner in which
mass culture and governmental institutions could change social behavior, including
criminal behavior, on a mass level. Much of this thinking came out of Germany's
Frankfurt School, an institution founded by scholars like Theodore Adorno, Leo
Lwenthal, and Max Horkheimer in the 1920s. 99 To them, mass culture created a
variety of opportunities for influencing large numbers of people, not always for the
better.1°° Adorno and Horkheimer, for example, studied the manner in which
popular culture facilitated fascism, a theory that drew inspiration from the rise of
the National Socialist Party in Germany in the 1930s.10' Indeed, by the time the
Nazis seized power in Germany in 1933, much of the Frankfurt School had fled to
the U.S., many ending up at the Institute for Social Research at Columbia
University.
102
One member of the Frankfurt school who ended up at Columbia and became
interested in criminal law pedagogy was Otto Kirchheimer. Kirchheimer, who
focused on penal institutions, spent time at Columbia rewriting Georg Rusche's
Punishment and Social Structure, a pioneering text examining the roles that
prisons played in modern society, not simply as penal institutions but buttresses to
the class structure. 103 In his own work, Kirchheimer explored tensions between
pragmatic and theoretical approaches to sentencing, as well as the possibilities of
using prison for rehabilitative ends. In a testament to his influence, Michael and
Wechsler cited Kirchheimer twice in their casebook, once to support the notion
that retribution might be justified "[u]nless the retributive purpose is deemed to be
authoritative," a classic Frankfurt School theme, and also to suggest that prisons
were rarely reformative institutions.
104
Though it is unlikely that Wechsler or Michael saw themselves as critical
theorists of the Frankfurt School variety, their citations to Kirchheimer suggest that
they were aware of the School's critical work. In fact, Kirchheimer himself gave
98 JOHN M. JORDAN, MACHINE-AGE IDEOLOGY: SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND AMERICAN
LIBERALISM, 1911-1939, at 44, 155-84 (1994).
99 See MAx HORKHEIMER & THEODORE W. ADoRNo, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT:
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS xix (Gunzelin Schmid Noerr ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., Stanford
University Press 2002) (1987); MARTIN JAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION: A HISTORY OF THE
FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTrrTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, 1923-1950 xv-xvi (1973).
100 HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 99, at 94-136.
101 Max Horkheimer & Theodor W. Adorno, The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass
Deception, in MEDIA AND CULTURAL STuDrEs: KEYWORKS 71, 100 (Meenakshi Gigi Durham &
Douglas M. Kellner eds., 2001).
102 JAY, supra note 99, at 25-100.
103 GEORG RuscHE & OTrO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1939).
104 MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 11, 14-15.
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Michael and Wechsler a remarkably positive review in 1941.105 Noting that
criminal law could be structured in at least two ways, either as a course in how to
"draw the boundary line" between criminal and non-criminal conduct, or as a
"broader" inquiry involving the "'integration of law and social sciences,"'
Kirchheimer praised Michael and Wechsler for pursuing the latter.10 6 In particular,
Kirchheimer lauded their inclusion of "'extra-legal' material, or readings that
fleshed out the "political and social conditions under which rules arise and are
constantly reshaped." 0 7 Such an approach, he argued, represented nothing less
than a "pioneer[ing] work" in the "art of teaching criminal law."'0 8
Not all scholars agreed. To Chicago Law Professor and Beale successor E.
W. Puttkammer, the "enormous" amount of "nonlegal" material that Michael and
Wechsler cited made their casebook "as much a reference work" as a "teaching
tool."' 9 In fact, Puttkammer even lamented that Michael and Wechsler had not
published the casebook as a reference text, noting that it was "almost appalling by
its sheer length" and a better fit for the reference "category."' 1 Others who
doubted the wisdom of incorporating social science materials to the extent that
Michael and Wechsler did included legal giant and one-time reformer Roscoe
Pound. "Criminology and penal methods should be put in graduate courses for
teachers and administrative officials," wrote Pound, not courses aimed at law
students who have "more than enough to do in learning the lawyer's technique." 11
"The need," that law schools faced, continued Pound in a conservative mood, was
not to train administrators but "to give competent fundamental training in criminal
law to those who are to take part as counsel, prosecutors and judges."'" 2 Taking
"part" as counselors and judges meant training practitioners, not the kind of federal
administrative attorneys that Herbert Wechsler had in mind. Indeed, Pound
seemed to think that Wechsler's type of training would actually harm "first-year
law students" by instilling in them "wrong ideas" about criminal practice that
would be difficult to "dislodge," ultimately compromising "the administration of
justice."'' 3
105 See Otto Kirchheimer, Criminal Law and Its Administration: Cases, Statutes, and
Commentaries by Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler, 32 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 451 (1941)
(book review).
106 Id.
'07 Id. at 452.
108 Id. at 453.
109 Puttkammer, supra note 16, at 387-88.
ii0 Id. at 388.
"'1 Roscoe Pound, Introduction to the First Edition of ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE xiv (1952) [hereinafter Pound, Introduction]. For
evidence of Pound's early, reformist impulse, see ROSCOE POUND, TOWARD A BETIER CRIMINAL LAW
(1935).
112 Pound, Introduction, supra note 111, at xiv.
113 Id. at xiii, xiv-xv.
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Pound's concern for the administration of justice, coupled with his reluctance
to push too far in the social science direction, came from at least two sources.
One, interestingly, was the rise of Stalinism in Russia, a political development that
led him to fear that abandoning the case method might actually increase the
chances of America becoming an authoritarian state.' 14 Just as Herbert Wechsler
believed that the case method fostered private-minded attorneys who prized
private, laissez-faire ordering over public law, Pound came to believe the opposite:
abandoning the case method risked creating statist attorneys who ignored private
interests in favor of big government. "In the Soviet polity," noted Pound in 1952,
"punitive justice has been substantially taken away from the courts and made a
matter of administrative action."' 1 5 Something similar, he believed, could happen
in the United States, particularly if "advocates, prosecutors, and judges are not well
trained in the law."' 16 Implying that students who learned from Michael and
Wechsler's approach were not "well trained in the law," Pound went on to argue
that students not inculcated in the common law tradition "may well turn us from
the traditional judicial path of the common law into the administrative path." 117
Such a development, feared Pound, would place the United States "on the road to
absolute government." 118
Pound's comments suggest, remarkably, that Stalinism raised questions about
American legal education. 119 Of course, neither Jerome Michael nor Herbert
Wechsler were Stalinists, nor did they believe that abandoning the common law
would lead to authoritarianism. Yet, Pound's fear that their emphasis on
administration detracted from the common law's traditional aversion to statism
was not completely unreasonable. As outlandish as Pound's concerns seemed,
even Michael and Wechsler would probably have agreed that America's adherence
to the common law had empowered the private sector, making it capable not only
of withstanding state intrusion but, as the destruction of the First New Deal
suggested, overcoming it. The very same factors that made Michael and Wechsler
New Dealers also subjected them to charges of being unwitting supporters of a
tendency towards the kind of authoritarianism emerging in the U.S.S.R, Eastern
Europe, and China.
Whether Pound thought that Michael and Wechsler were proto-authoritarians
or not, he had at least one other reason for lobbying against their approach to
114 Id. at xix.
115 Id. at xviii. Pound began to worry about authoritarian regimes in 1933, when the Nazi
Party seized power in Germany and began to reconfigure the nation's legal system along Nazi lines.
See RosCOE POUND, CoNTEMPoRARY JuRisTic THEORY 9 (1940). See also EDGAR BODENHEIMER,
JURISPRUDENCE 316 (1940); Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 186-89 (1937).
116 Pound, Introduction, supra note 111, at xviii.
117 Id. at xviii.
118 Id. at xix.
119 For more on Pound's fear of authoritarianism, see DAVID CIEPLEY, LIBERALISM IN THE
SHADOW OF TOTALITARIANISM 266 (2006).
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teaching criminal law. Like Columbia's administrators in the 1930s, he too
recognized that "[e]conomic causes" had led "leaders of the [legal] profession" to
look down on careers spent in the "criminal courts."'' 20 Pound also realized that "no
ambitious student in a national law school" would actively seek "practice in
criminal cases." 121 Yet, this left the question open as to students who were not
enrolled in national schools. What were they to do? Rather than waste their time
questioning the common law, Pound believed that students at less prestigious
regional schools should learn how to practice. 122  He made this apparent by
agreeing to write an introduction for a casebook assembled by University of
California Los Angeles law professor Rollin M. Perkins in 1952.123
Perkins declared an open concern for the practitioner in his preface, rejecting
the Michael-and-Wechsler approach to criminal law teaching on the grounds that it
did not prepare students for actual practice.' 24 Blasting the authors for tailoring
their casebook to students who had "other purposes" for taking criminal law than
entering the criminal bar, Perkins made sure to note in his preface that "the first
need of the lawyer is to know what the law is.' 125 "A class made up of beginning
law students," he continued, "must not be conducted as if it were a 'lawyer's
seminar,"' nor should professors use cases as "mere pegs on which to hang general
discussions of criminology."'
126
Determined not to focus on criminology-or any other type of social science
for that matter-Professor Perkins assembled a casebook that was classically
Bealean. Just as Beale presented students with large numbers of cases and few
outside sources, Perkins did the same. To cover the broad topic of homicide, he
included no less than twenty-five cases and no subheadings. This meant that
students had to determine for themselves which cases applied to murder,
manslaughter, negligent homicide and so on.
127
The UCLA professor also ignored materials that questioned the common law.
Unlike Michael and Wechsler, who had students debating whether European codes
were "wiser" than American ones, or whether Oliver Wendell Holmes's theory of
increasing punishment for heat-of-passion killings improved the common law,
Perkins used outside sources only when he thought it necessary to illustrate black
letter rules. For example, to help students grasp the law of homicide, he included
in his appendix an abbreviated version of a law review article that he himself had
120 Pound, Introduction, supra note 111, at xviii.
121 Id.
122 Id. at xviii.
123 Id. at xiii-xix.
124 Rollin M. Perkins, Preface to the First Edition of ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE ix (1952) [hereinafter Perkins, Preface].
125 Id. at ix-x.
126 Id. at x.
127 BEALE, CASES, supra note 12, at 461-87; PERKINS, supra note 124, at 1-62.
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written on the distinction between murder and manslaughter. 128 Organized much
like a legal treatise, the article presented murder, manslaughter, and partial
defenses like provocation in relatively straightforward, uncritical terms. Though
the excerpt discussed the provocation defense, for example, it failed to ask whether
defendants acting in the heat of passion deserved harsher penalties, as Holmes's
piece had, opting instead to simply classify and explain common law examples of
when provocation applied; e.g., battery, mutual combat, trespass, and adultery.'
29
Interestingly, even though Perkins adopted a much more conservative
approach than Michael and Wechsler, he still appropriated what might be called a
Wechslerian "look." Instead of simply entitling his book Cases on Criminal Law
as Beale did, for example, Perkins used the more suggestive, Cases and Materials
on Criminal Law, even though there were few "materials" to be found.130 He also
downplayed the reactionary nature of his text, being sure to mention in his preface
that his casebook was not a reaction to the social science method so much as a
move toward a "middle position" between Langdell and the social science
approach.'31 Of course, this raised an obvious question: Why bother downplaying
the text's aversion to social science? One possibility is that Perkins wanted to sell
copies. By 1952, the year Perkins's casebook was published, the Michael-and-
Wechsler casebook was enjoying widespread popularity.' 32 In fact, the authors
were considering a second edition when Michael died in 1953.1
33
Driving the popularity of their text was a convergence of forces that placed
social science at the center of criminal law teaching in the 1950s. Perhaps
foremost among these was an ascendant faith in the ability of science and experts
to improve almost all aspects of human life. 34 Though faith in experts impacted
law in myriad ways, one manifestation emerged in calls by legal academics and
professional associations to reform criminal law, a field that had long suffered
from academic and professional "neglect.' 35 In 1951, the Rockefeller Foundation
granted the American Law Institute, or ALI, money to put toward a Model Penal
Code (MPC) that would revise irrational, arbitrary aspects of the common law. 36
Though the ALI had envisioned such a code before, rapid developments in
"disciplines concerned with social aspects of behavior," revitalized interest in the
128 PERKINS, supra note 124, at 771-808.
129 See, e.g., id. at 783-90.
130 Id.
131 Id. at x.
132 HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (Supp. 1956) [hereinafter
WECHSLER, SUPPLEMENT].
133 Id. at iii. Michael's death in 1953 was one reason Wechsler later cited for not coming out
with revised editions of their casebook. Id.
134 See, e.g., SEYMOUR FREiDiN & GEORGE BAILEY, THE EXPERTS (1968).
135 Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1097, 1098-
1100 (1952) [hereinafter Wechsler, Challenge].
136 Id. at 1097.
236 [Vol 7: 217
THE ANTI-CASE METHOD
late 1940s and early 1950s. 137 Convinced that state legislatures could benefit from
new developments in social science, the ALI hoped to complete its criminal code
by the end of the decade.'
38
To facilitate the MPC's completion, the ALl asked Herbert Wechsler, now
renowned for his criminal law casebook, to serve as the Chief Reporter for the
Model Penal Code project. 139 Long interested in shifting emphasis away from the
courts and toward public law solutions, Wechsler not only accepted the offer but
quickly applied the policy-oriented approach that he had developed in class to the
MPC, incorporating new discoveries in social science, particularly psychology, to
the criminal law context. To take just a few examples, one initiative that Wechsler
supported was the replacement of common law notions of malice for more
dispassionate classifications of purpose, knowledge, and recklessness. Another
revision that Wechsler supported was the incorporation of social science studies on
human sexuality to decriminalize moral offenses, most notably adultery. 40
Inspired by his work with the ALI, Wechsler began to incorporate MPC
materials into his teaching, using them to reinforce his longstanding view that
cases were not enough. In 1956, for example, Wechsler published a supplement to
Criminal Law & Its Administration that included ALI reports on subjects as
diverse as robbery, extortion, theft, mistake of law, and insanity. 4 ' Again and
again, the ALI materials that Wechsler included presented the common law as
irrational and outdated-a message that coincided nicely with Wechsler's
longstanding goal of undermining student reverence for judicial law-making,
meanwhile casting favorable light on public law solutions. Though the New Deal
played no role in the development of the MPC, the Code's emergence only
reinforced Wechsler's ongoing interest in awakening students to the world of
public law.
Interestingly, the fact that most states had begun to codify their criminal law
long before the MPC was even envisioned did not stop Wechsler from using the
model code to criticize judges.142  Indeed, he found instances where judicial
interpretations of state codes had corrupted the original intent of those codes,
providing him with an opportunity to show students, again, that they needed to be
critical of cases. To take just one example, Wechsler focused on Pennsylvania's
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1097 n.1.
139 Id. at 1097 n.2.
'40 See id. at 1106.
141 WECHSLER, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 132, at 1-3 (homicide-culpability), 23-24 (homicide-
causation), 64-66 (rape), 71-73 (robbery and extortion), 76-77 (acquisition by fraud), 86-88 (theft-
acquisitive methods), 91-92 (theft-intent and motive), 112-15 (theft-treatment problems), 153-56
(accomplice liability), 157-62 (corporate liability), 174-83 (mistake of law), 212-22 (insanity), 249-
52 (recidivism).
142 For a history of pre-MPC codification, see Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal
Law: Wechsler's Predecessors, 78 COLuM. L. REv. 1098 (1978).
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codification of murder in 1794, showing how the crime had been intentionally
separated by the state legislature into two degrees for the purpose of reducing the
number of defendants given the death penalty. 143 As originally envisioned by the
statute's drafters, defendants needed to premeditate and deliberate on their crime in
order to be convicted of first-degree murder.44 If they did not plan their crime in
advance, but simply acted on impulse or anger, then the highest charge that they
might face was second-degree murder. 45 While this move gained widespread
attention and praise for its progressive approach to limiting the death penalty,
common law judges quickly began to confuse the distinction between first and
second degree, grouping crimes where defendants had taken only an instant to
deliberate into the first-degree category. 46 For Wechsler and the ALI alike, this
tendency warranted a substantial statutory revision, one that eliminated first-degree
murder completely. 47 According to the Model Penal Code, murder could be
charged wherever an offender killed with "purpose," regardless of whether they
premeditated or deliberated.
48
While the drafting of the MPC provided Wechsler with an opportunity to
bolster his innovative approach to teaching criminal law, the completion of the
MPC in 1962 canonized it. Suddenly, the idea of teaching criminal law as a
common law course, without attention to public law solutions or policy
considerations seemed completely out of step with real world trends. This became
even truer when New York and other states began substantial revisions of their
criminal codes in the early 1960s, ultimately adopting large portions of the MPC.
Though reactionaries like Rollin Perkins continued to feed students a steady diet of
cases, a younger generation of criminal law teachers emerged who de-emphasized
case law just as much, if not more than Wechsler, substituting in its place law
review articles, statistical studies, open-ended policy questions and, of course, the
MPC.
IV. SANFORD H. KADISH AND THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CASEBOOK
One of the first casebooks to carry the torch lit by Michael and Wechsler in
the 1930s was a text assembled by Monrad G. Paulsen and Sanford H. Kadish in
1962. Entitled Criminal Law and Its Processes, Paulsen and Kadish's casebook
143 Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: 1, 37 COLUM. L.
REv. 701, 703-08 (1937). Wechsler had been interested in the judicial obliteration of the distinction
between premeditated and non-premeditated murder since the 1930s. See JEROME MICHAEL &
HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMnISTRATION 167-170 (1940 & Supp. 1956)
[hereinafter MICHAEL & WECHSLER, ADMINISTRATION].
144 Wechsler & Michael, supra note 143.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 MICHAEL & WECHSLER, ADMINISTRATION, supra note 143.
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represented, as Kadish himself remembered it, a direct "descendant" of Wechsler
and Michael's Criminal Law and Its Administration.149 In fact, both Paulsen and
Kadish directly acknowledged "an intellectual indebtedness" to "Professor Herbert
Wechsler of the Columbia Law School," who in their opinion had "left an impress
upon the teaching and thinking in the criminal law," that in their opinion, was both
"lasting" and "profound.
150
The link to Wechsler, at least for Kadish, began in law school. Following
World War UI, Kadish enrolled at Columbia and took Wechsler's criminal law
course, a class that he remembered for being "intellectually exciting" in a way that
"other classes were not."'151 Struck by Wechsler's "utilitarian," even "Benthamite"
approach to the law, Kadish was particularly impressed with Wechsler's tendency
to approach the subject "from a legislative point of view. 152  When Monrad
Paulsen approached Kadish with the idea of assembling a casebook in the late
1950s, Kadish agreed, eventually drafting the largest section of the text on
substantive criminal law, leaving Paulsen to criminal procedure. 53  Though
criminal procedure was originally intended to dominate the book, the "tail wagged
the dog," as Kadish later remembered it, leaving Paulsen's section to the very end,
ultimately to be eliminated in subsequent editions.
154
In honor of Wechsler, Kadish began his portion of the casebook with a section
on "crime, morals, and personal liberty" that did not include a single case. 55
Eschewing the common law, he immersed his first year students in the Model
Penal Code, the Scottish Home Department's "Report on Homosexual Offenses
and Prostitution," Lord Justice Devlin's lecture on "the Enforcement of Morals,"
and an excerpt from H.L.A. Hart's article "Immorality and Treason.,, 156 Knowing
full well that "adultery, fornication and prostitution" were all still offenses in the
United States, Kadish pushed his students to consider whether such offenses
should be eliminated. 157 Regardless of the answer that individual students arrived
at-either moral offenses should be eliminated or not-the underlying lesson was
clear: criminal law-and perhaps law generally-was neither immutable nor
absolute. It relied not on longstanding principles culled from common law cases,
but policy considerations, statistical data, and academic studies. Students, once
required to kneel at the arcane oracle of the common law judge, were now asked to
be legislators-and to come up with their own opinions of what the law should be.
149 Kadish, Interview, supra note 6 at 11.
150 PAULSEN & KADISH, supra note 6, at xiii.
151 Kadish, Interview, supra note 6, at 1.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 6.
'54 Id. at 7.
155 PAULsEN & KADISH, supra note 6, at 3-17.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 5 n.b.
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Even when Kadish did include cases, the basic mission of getting students to
think like legislators did not change. For example, to explain the distinction
between first- and second-degree murder, Kadish asked his students to read only
one case from Utah where the common law judge lamented the fact that the
distinction between first- and second-degree murder was meaningless. 158 "It is
true," noted the judge, "that quite a number of courts" had approved jury
instructions allowing jurors to find premeditation even though there was "no
appreciable space of time between the intention to kill and the act of killing."159
Convinced that this trend was bad, the judge nevertheless held that jurors should be
allowed to find premeditation so long as the defendant developed a "fixed design
or purpose" in a "space of time" no matter how "brief., 160 For students assigned to
brief the case, the legal rule was both clear and ridiculous: some time should be
allowed for the development of premeditation, yet no time was actually needed to
premeditate a murder. Rather than use the opinion to present one piece of a larger
puzzle, like Perkins's twenty-five cases on homicide, Kadish used one case to
present the whole puzzle, then revealed it to be a travesty of justice.
The approach won instant praise. In a 1964 edition of the Harvard Law
Review, Stanford University Law Professor Herbert L. Packer commended Kadish
for assembling "the best conventional teaching book" in what was otherwise a
"grimy" field of law usually reserved for the "most disfavored segment of the
bar."' 161 In particular, Packer praised Kadish's beginning chapters on legislative
choice, legality, and sentencing, all of which boasted "comparatively little reliance
on case material."'162 Rather than decry the absence of specific offenses like
kidnapping, arson, and robbery, Packer rejoiced that "the dreary round of
differential definitions" which formed the most "conspicuous feature" of many
criminal law courses was gone, leaving professors obligated to only instruct their
students in two crimes, homicide and theft. 16 3 In a laudatory mood, Packer
declared that the Paulsen-and-Kadish casebook represented the "only reasonable
alternative" to the Michael-and-Wechsler text "now available. 164
Packer's review indicates that Michael and Wechsler's text was still
something of a benchmark by which other casebooks were judged even in the
1960s. Though condescending in his attitude towards criminal practice, nothing
new among law scholars, Packer clearly believed that Michael and Wechsler had
elevated the subject's intellectual status. In fact, he even dated the "arrival" of
"full intellectual respectability" to criminal law with the publication of their
15' Id. at 558 (citing State v. Anselmo, 148 P. 1071 (1915)).
159 PAULSEN & KADISH, supra note 6, at 558-59.
160 Id. at 560.
161 Herbert L. Packer, Book Review, 77 HARv. L. REV. 790 (1964) (reviewing MoNRAD G.
PAULSEN & SANFORD H. KADISH, CRnINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (1962)).
162 Packer, supra note 161, at 791.
'63 Id. at 794.
'64 Id. at 791.
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textbook in 1940, over twenty years earlier.1 65 Yet, Michael and Wechsler's book
had never gone through a second edition and sorely needed an overhaul. For
example, the text did not take into consideration the recent completion of the
Model Penal Code in 1962, nor did it address the increasing criticism of moral
offenses like adultery and fornication in the academic literature and press
nationwide.' 66
Kadish and Paulsen addressed both subjects directly. Not only did their first
chapter focus on the policy behind punishing moral offenses, but they included
substantial portions of the MPC commentaries in their text.' 67 This emphasis on
the MPC carried through the entire substantive criminal law portion of the book,
providing students with a timely counterpoint to common law doctrine. 168 As the
1960s progressed, such a counterpoint to the common law proved more and more
relevant as states began adopting portions of the MPC, including New York, which
enlisted Herbert Wechsler himself to serve on a temporary commission to revise
the state's criminal law in 1961.69
By 1969, interest in the MPC and, by extension, Criminal Law & Its
Processes, was so high that Paulsen and Kadish put together a second edition. In
this version, they continued to use cases as pegs upon which to hang discussions of
criminology, criminal law theory, and ethics. For example, they included one case
on narcotics possession to push students to consider whether users who suffer
addiction should be punished. 170 They also added material culled from the civil
rights movement in the American South, including a case from South Carolina
where the U.S. Supreme Court had declared that the state's segregation statutes did
not grant black sit-in demonstrators "fair warning" to stay out of white
restaurants. 171
Though times had changed considerably since the 1930s, Kadish and Paulsen
continued down Wechsler's road in the 1960s, away from the case method and
towards a more open-ended inquiry into why the law existed as it did. The advent
of the MPC fueled this approach, as did the political climate of the 1960s.
172
165 Id.
166 See, e.g., ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948);
JONATHAN GATHORNE-HARDY, SEX THE MEASURE OF ALL THINGS: A LIFE OF ALFRED C. KINSEY
(Indiana University Press 2000) (1998).
167 PAULSEN & KADISH, supra note 6, at 3-17.
168 Id.
169 State Picks Panel on Criminal Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1961, at 39; David Burnham,
New State Penal Law Takes Effect on Friday, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 30, 1967, at 54. By 1988, almost
forty states had enacted at least some portion of the MPC into law. Richard G. Singer, Foreword, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 519 (1988).
170 SANFORD H. KADISH & MONRAD G. PAULSEN, CRImINAL LAW AND ITS PROcESsES 106-22
(2d ed. 1969).
171 Id. at 43-46.
172 Kadish, Interview, supra note 6, at 7.
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Questions of racial justice, police brutality, and the arbitrary definition of crime all
became issues of real concern thanks to the civil rights movement in the South,
urban riots in the North, and rising crime nationally. 173 Even as these issues
cooled, Kadish and Paulsen continued on, into the new millennium. From 1962 to
1975, Criminal Law and Its Processes went through three editions. 74 By the turn
of the twenty-first century, it had gone through seven editions, with Stephen J.
Schulhofer joining the casebook and replacing Monrad Paulsen upon his death. 175
In 2007, it emerged in its eighth revised form, with Carol S. Steiker joining the
casebook. 176 Processes even inspired disciples, most notably Joshua Dressler, who
designated his own casebook, first published in 1994, a "son of Kadish."'
177
Even scholars who did not directly credit Wechsler or Kadish built on their
basic model, providing students with a relatively small number of carefully
selected cases along with a rich assortment of notes, questions, and outside
sources. In 1969, for example, Harvard professor Lloyd L. Weinreb published a
casebook that separated criminal law from criminal procedure, a move that other
authors would quickly make, but then retained the model developed by Wechsler
and Kadish for his substantive criminal law portion. 78 He began with three
chapters on the general and special parts of criminal law, including a limited
number of cases along with notes, commentary, newspaper excerpts, and law
review citations, and then concluded with a Wechslerian chapter on "Crime and
Punishment" that incorporated what one reviewer called an "unusual m6lange" of
materials. 179 The materials included "[q]uotations from classics in philosophy,"
excerpts from sentencing reports, and portions of a debate between H.L.A. Hart,
John Stuart Mill, and James Fitzjames Stephen. 180 Though ordered differently than
173 Michael J. Klarman, Is the Supreme Court Sometimes Irrelevant? Race and the Southern
Criminal Justice System in the 1940s, 89 J. Am. HIST. 119 (2002). See generally MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIvIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY (2004).
174 SANFORD H. KADISH & MONRAD G. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (2d ed.
1969); SANFORD H. KADISH & MONRAD G. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (3d ed.
1975).
175 SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & MONRAD G. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES (4th ed. 1983); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES (5th ed. 1989); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES (6th ed. 1995); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES (7th ed. 2001).
176 SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES (8th ed. 2007).
177 JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW ix (1st ed. 1994); JOSHUA
DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW xi (2d ed. 1999); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW xi (3d ed. 2003); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CRIMINAL LAW xi (4th ed. 2007).
178 LLOYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT, QUESTIONS xi (1969).
179 Philip J. Mause, Book Review, 84 HARv. L. REv. 504, 512 (1970).
1so Id.
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Kadish's introductory chapters, Weinreb's inclusion of outside sources, as well as
philosophical and criminological materials, nevertheless represented an obvious
variation of Wechsler's approach. Weinreb himself explained that he wanted his
students to consider the "moral, political, and social issues" surrounding criminal
law, not just the rules.' 81
Four years later, in 1973, George E. Dix and M. Michael Sharlot, both of the
University of Texas, continued the Wechslerian tradition with Criminal Law:
Cases and Materials, which began with an excerpt from "The Challenge of Crime
in a Free Society," a report on rising crime rates put together by Lyndon Johnson's
special commission on law enforcement and administration of justice. 82 The text
continued with sections on the criminalization of alcohol intoxication, pulling
together excerpts from scholarly treatises, statistical studies, and "criminal
histories of alcoholics."' 83 Throughout, the casebook aimed to be "more than a
vehicle" for students to learn "the law of crimes," shooting instead to "facilitate
inquiry" into the "broadest issues" of the "relationship of the individual to the
state."'18
4
Without describing each subsequent casebook to emerge since 1973, suffice it
to say that no new approaches to teaching criminal law arose in the twentieth
century.185 Though different authors stressed different areas, the general method
remained the same.' 86 Cases remained central, but were fewer in number and more
heavily supplemented by outside materials than during Beale's time.' 87 Normative
questions also frequently followed cases, pushing students to think critically about
why the law was as it was, and whether it should be changed. 88
So far, Wechsler's model has survived into the twenty-first century, with
perhaps one exception.' 89  Paul Robinson, on the faculty at the University of
Pennsylvania, substantially altered the casebook format in 2005 by beginning each
section with a crime scenario followed by extensive statutory materials and only
brief case excerpts. 90 Following each scenario, Robinson asked students to
behave as practitioners and determine "what liability, if any" existed under the
prevailing law.' 9' At first glance, this method marks an interesting turn towards a
181 WEINREB, supra note 178, at xii.
182 GEORGE E. Dix & M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (1st ed.
1973).
183 Id. at 148-59.
1'4 Id. at XI.
185 See supra note 6.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Twenty-first century casebooks tend to be improvements on, rather than digressions from,
Wechsler. See, e.g., DUBBER & KELMAN, supra note 6; LEE & HARRIS, supra note 6.
190 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES (lst ed. 2005).
191 Id.
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more practitioner-oriented approach, one that pushes students to evaluate facts as if
they were prosecutors. Yet, even Robinson includes a Wechslerian twist. After
each problem, he locates a "discussion materials" section that includes excerpts
from law reviews, academic studies and so on, providing law teachers with the
option of finishing topics on a normative, policy-oriented note. 192 Assuming that
discussion sections are assigned, Robinson's text is the least case-friendly to have
been compiled yet, marking in certain ways the culmination of Wechsler's revolt
against the case method.
19 3
This raises a question of cause and effect. While it is undoubtedly true that
Wechsler viewed the addition of non-case materials to be a rebellion against the
case method in the 1930s, could the same be said of scholars who came after
him?194 Is it not possible that they might have moved away from the method on
their own, independent of Wechsler's influence? Perhaps. The completion of the
MPC in 1962, which Wechsler directed, essentially transformed the field so
dramatically that even the most unreconstructed adherents to Langdell's method
(Rollin Perkins being perhaps the best example) ultimately had to concede the
"dominance" of statutory materials to the study of criminal law by the end of the
century.
195
Yet, just because statutes became a bigger part of the criminal law does not
mean that casebooks necessarily had to follow Wechsler's model to the extent that
they did. For example, it could have been possible for scholars to do what Paul
Robinson has done, namely include statutory materials side by side with cases,
without any additional discussion section, pushing students to reflect on why the
law says what it does. One thing that Wechsler contributed to the field was a
particular "perspective," to borrow from Kadish, not so much of a lawyer but a
type of hypothetical legislator, interested in both normative and intellectual
questions of ethics, science, sociology, and politics.
196
V. CONCLUSION
While most criminal law scholars would probably not attribute the structure of
their casebooks to Herbert Wechsler, they could. Beginning in the 1930s,
Wechsler intentionally transformed the manner in which criminal law casebooks
were organized, reducing cases in favor of supplementary materials culled from
philosophy, criminology, and other disciplines. The result not only proved
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 For example, Sanford Kadish later recalled that even though his casebook was a direct
"descendant" of Wechsler's, he (Kadish) was not "burning with some reformist zeal" when he wrote
it. Kadish, Interview, supra note 6, at 11.
195 Donald A. Dripps, Introduction to RONALD N. BOYCE, DONALD A. DRIPPS & ROLLIN M.
PERKINS, CRIMNAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS iii, iii-v (9th ed. 2004).
196 Kadish, Interview, supra note 6, at 12.
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popular, but helped elevate the status of a course that many scorned for being
associated with a professionally undesirable, disreputable field. By the 1960s,
Wechsler's model had become the dominant format for criminal law casebooks,
and criminal law courses, in the United States.
That dominance continues today. Precisely for this reason, it is worth
recovering the history behind why Wechsler organized his course in the way that
he did. For example, much of Wechsler's innovation was made possible by the
fact that elite law schools like Columbia were not interested in training criminal
lawyers. This freed Wechsler to innovate in a way that professors who taught
contracts, property, and commercial law could not.' 97 It also transformed the
mission of the course, if you will, nudging it away from practical training to policy
considerations and ethics. While Columbia initially thought that this would better
train administrative attorneys and policy analysts for Roosevelt's New Deal,
Wechsler's innovation proved permanent. Two decades after the publication of his
casebook in 1940, Wechsler's approach was fast defining the field, transforming
criminal law from a skills course to what Sanford Kadish remembers as an attempt
to produce "good, sensitive, aware, socially conscious," citizens.
98
That law schools should strive to produce better citizens is hard to refute.
However, the Carnegie Foundation's recent recommendation that law school
education return to an emphasis on legal practice raises questions about the
possible tension between skills and ethics. 199 For example, do law schools still
view criminal practice to be undesirable? If so, then perhaps Wechsler's
innovations should remain in place, regardless of the Carnegie report. Then again,
what if schools decide to get more serious about training criminal law
practitioners? Do they not sacrifice some amount of practical training by pursuing
Wechsler's approach? What good are ethics, philosophy, and sociology if
graduating students do not know the law?
Of course, scholars might argue that Wechsler's approach is unavoidable
given the dramatic rise in codification over the course of the past four decades.
Yet, even a brief glimpse at the history of the criminal law course suggests that
codification was not what inspired Wechsler to change his approach. He rejected
the case method for political reasons, blaming the method for inculcating a narrow
view of the law that contributed to the Supreme Court's destruction of the first
New Deal. This explains why he moved towards normative questions in his notes.
He did not simply want students to be able to analyze and interpret statutes; he
wanted them to question the law, and to recognize its relationship to society. If
Wechsler had not felt anger at the case method, it is entirely possible that a
criminal law textbook would have evolved, like Robinson's evolved, which
merged statutes and cases in a problem-oriented fashion.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 14.
199 SULLIvAN, supra note 11.
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Recovering the political motivations behind Wechsler's anti-case method
raises questions about the political implications of legal education generally. To
take just one example, Duncan Kennedy's now legendary attack on legal education
as a "reproduction of illegitimate hierarchy" fails to recognize that Wechsler and
Michael's approach to criminal law sought to reproduce a very different type of
hierarchy than the one Langdell had originally intended in 18 7 0 .200 Rather than
engender a reverence for judicial precedent and the private ordering of economic
affairs, as Langdell had sought, Michael and Wechsler aimed to instill a respect for
public ordering and governmental intervention in private matters, in line with
Roosevelt's statist New Deal.20 1 The success of their approach, which coincided
with realist calls for reform at Yale in the 1930s, hints at a larger thesis: not only
did the New Deal usher in the decline of Lochner-era jurisprudence, but it hastened
the demise of Lochner-era lawyers.20 2
Even if Michael and Wechsler' s antipathy to private law did not transform the
American lawyer, criminal law remains perhaps the only first year course to
represent an open revolt against the case method. This means that at a basic
pedagogical level, criminal law does not necessarily teach the things that the
method teaches, including legal reasoning, deductive analysis, or how to think like
a lawyer. In fact, criminal law might be teaching students how not to think like
lawyers. This, after all, was Wechsler's intention. Lawyers, in his opinion, had
blindly endorsed legal fictions like substantive due process and liberty of contract
at the expense of the nation, driving it to economic ruin. What needed to happen,
in his opinion, was an explosion of this "closed system," in favor of a much more
critical mode of analysis.0 3
Whether law schools should be in the business of teaching such analysis is
worth reconsidering, if for no other reason than to justify current practice in the
face of mounting doubt. For example, one could easily read the Carnegie Report
and argue that the battles that Wechsler was fighting in the 1930s are over. No
longer do common law courses dominate law school. Administrative law,
contracts, commercial transactions, and tax all push students to deal with statutory
200 DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC
AGAINST THE SYSTEM 15 (2004).
201 For Langdell's interest in bolstering private ordering and laissez-faire, see KALMAN, supra
note 4, at 13.
202 Laura Kalman only touches on the impact that the New Deal had on legal pedagogy in the
United States. She notes, for example, that Yale was more open to realist approaches due to the
shifting job market of the Great Depression. Id. at 182. She also notes that Jerome Frank stepped up
his criticism of Langdell once he was appointed general counsel to Roosevelt's Agricultural
Adjustment Administration in 1933. Id. at 168. Beyond that, she does not venture to argue that the
Depression shifted legal pedagogy towards the production of attorneys who believed that legal
solutions to society's most pressing problems lay in public, not private law. Instead, Kalman draws a
much narrower conclusion, namely that legal realism made a "positive contribution" to legal
education by making it impossible to understand traditional subjects "without acknowledging the
relevance of history, sociology, and psychiatry." Id. at 229.
203 Wechsler, Interview, supra note 8, at 104-05.
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materials as well as judicial opinions. Further, the Model Penal Code is not only
an established part of the criminal law in most states, but it is also over half a
century old and has begun to produce its own body of common law interpreting it.
Though it may be too early to say that we have entered a new common law era, it
is certainly true that the MPC has taken on a life of its own as states have adopted
portions of it and modified others to meet particularized, local needs. Are students
who have undergone Wechsler's method prepared to deal with those needs? Can
they perform the kind of case analysis that is currently needed to find legal
answers? And can law schools, particularly regional schools, continue to afford to
adopt the elite mentality that criminal law is not a worthy profession?
While such questions may not strike criminal law teachers as particularly
important, recovering Wechsler's revolt against Langdell sheds light on how at
least one law school course moved away from a practitioner's perspective.
Recovering this process for other courses may be the next step towards explaining
why the Carnegie Foundation discovered the problems that it did, setting the stage
for more widespread curricular reform. Or, recovering Wechsler may do
something else entirely: it may help law school administrators counter the
Carnegie findings with a larger vision of what legal education, ultimately, should
be about.
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